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ABSTRACT
When implementing secure software, developers must ensure cer-
tain requirements, such as the erasure of secret data after its use
and execution in real time. Such requirements are not explicitly
captured by the C language and could potentially be violated by
compiler optimizations. As a result, developers typically use indi-
rect methods to hide their code’s semantics from the compiler and
avoid unwanted optimizations. However, such workarounds are
not permanent solutions, as increasingly efficient compiler opti-
mization causes code that was considered secure in the past now
vulnerable.
This paper is a literature review of (1) the security complications
caused by compiler optimizations, (2) approaches used by devel-
opers to mitigate optimization problems, and (3) recent academic
efforts towards enabling security engineers to communicate im-
plicit security requirements to the compiler. In addition, we present
a short study of six cryptographic libraries and how they approach
the issue of ensuring security requirements. With this paper, we
highlight the need for software developers and compiler designers
to work together in order to design efficient systems for writing
secure software.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Cryptography;Cryptography; • Soft-
ware and its engineering→ Compilers; Compilers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Making software secure requires the assurance of its consistency
when executed. Developers must thus ensure that certain properties
are respected, although some cannot be explicitly conveyed to
the compiler. For example, cryptographic algorithms must run in
constant time to be secure against timing attacks. However, there is
currently no way of communicating this intention to the compiler.
As a result, the programmer might use indirect techniques in order
to achieve the intended goals by controlling the side effects of the
target language and its compiler.
On the other hand, when designing compile time optimizations,
compiler designers are more concerned about the defined standards
of the language than those properties required by software devel-
opers. With more efficient compilers being produced every day,
techniques used by the programmers might be broken by more
advanced compiler optimizations in the future.
This creates a counter-productive race between software devel-
opers and compiler designers. We advocate for both parties to work
in conjunction, in order to achieve a more simple and efficient com-
piling/development system that can yield more secure software. In
this paper, we discuss the compiler optimizations that break secu-
rity properties, and recent work that proposes and demonstrates
modifications to the compiler systems to allow developers to specify
desirable program properties.
This paper is structured as follows. We first introduce back-
ground information about compiler optimization in Section 2. We
then present an overview of the problems caused by the require-
ment gap between software developers and compiler designers in
Section 3. Section 4, details various approaches used to mitigate the
side effects created by compiler optimization and further explain
the implementation of some of these approaches. In Section 6, we
investigate open-source cryptographic libraries and the techniques
they use to control the side effects. Finally, we present the related
work in Section 7, the future work in Section 8, and conclude in
Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
Compilers translate program instructions from one programming
language to another. In the case of C / C++, the high-level program
code written by the developer is translated into machine-level in-
structions which can be executed on a processor. The translation
operation also optimizes the program, for example by detecting and
removing unused variables, or dead code. Compiler optimization is
the process of improving the performance of the translated code
without changing its functionality. Primary attributes such as the
execution time, the code size, or the compile time are typical candi-
dates for optimization. However, some optimization techniques can
interfere with the security properties encoded in the source code,
which are then lost after the translation.
In this section, we present a few compiler optimization tech-
niques which are relevant for the remainder of this paper. We focus
on optimizations for C, which have been observed to alter the
expected security properties of a program [10], and present the
compiler flags used to enable or disable them. Unfortunately, none
of those optimizations can be explicitly controlled in the compiler
yet, apart from disabling them.
Dead Store Elimination (DSE). DSE is an optimization used to
reduce execution time and memory usage. It finds memory store
operations that are either not used or overwritten and removes
those instructions. This is an issue when developers design their
code to scrub parts of the memory which were used for sensitive
data storage. DSE may remove the scrubbing instructions, and thus
expose sensitive data in memory. This is illustrated in Listings 1
Listing 1: Dead Store Elimination – C Code
1 int dummy(int x){
2 int y = x+1;
3 return y;
4 }
5
6 int secret_function (){
7 int key = 0xDEADBEEF;
8 int y = dummy(key);
9 key = 0x00; // <---- Missing in assembly code
10 return y;
11 }
Listing 2: Dead Store Elimination – Assembly Code
12 ; clang 3.9 -O1 -m32 -march=i386
13 dummy(int):
14 mov eax , dword ptr [esp + 4]
15 inc eax
16 ret
17
18 secret_function ():
19 sub esp , 12
20 mov dword ptr [esp], -559038737
21 call dummy(int)
22 add esp , 12 ; <---- Missing mov 0 (Optimized out
by DSE)
23 ret
and 2, where the key value in key is explicitly overwritten in the
C code, but is optimized out in the assembly code after compilation.
The mainstream C-compiler has no options or flags to explicitly
disable certain instructions from being optimized. Even though
the C programming language standard C11 includes a solution
to that issue: memset_s, a secured version of memset, there is no
standard-compliant implementation yet [23]. In recent research,
Yang et al. [23] and Simon et al. [21] have addressed this problem
by implementing support for secure dead store elimination, which
we discuss in detail in the Section 5.2.
Compiler flag: -fdse : Perform DSE.
Link Time Optimization (LTO). LTO is an inter-procedural op-
timization technique which analyzes all of the compilation units
of a program and optimizes it as a single module. This expands
the scope of the optimization to a global view. Some workarounds
programmers use in order to ensure program security work on the
scope of small modules, for example by depending on variables
defined in other modules, so that the compiler cannot resolve their
values and optimize them out. Compiling the program on a global
scale using LTO defeats such workarounds.
Compiler flag: -flto : Enable LTO.
Dead Code Elimination (DCE). DCE is a compiler optimization
that removes dead code: code that is never executed or does not
change the outcome of the program. This results in a smaller code
base and reduces the run time of a program by removing unused
operations. However, just like DSE, DCE might remove implicit
operations required by the code developer, for instance, a call to
zero a buffer.
Compiler flag: -fdce Perform DCE.
Tail-Call Optimization (TCO). TCO is a technique that optimizes
stack accesses during function calls. A tail call is a function call lo-
cated at the end of the caller function. TCO replaces such calls with
jump instructions, so that the stack frame of the calling function is
reused, as opposed to creating a new stack frame for the callee. This
optimizes memory usage. However, this can lead to the removal of
sensitive function calls, as described by Simon et al. [21].
Compiler flag: -foptimize-sibling-calls Optimize sibling
and tail recursive calls.
3 COMPLICATIONS CAUSED BY COMPILER
OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we discuss the main problems caused by the transla-
tion issues on compilation. We first detail the existing mechanisms
offered by the standard C compiler to address some of those issues,
which are called portability issues in the C standard [1]. We then ex-
pand on the two most popular security requirements not supported
by the C compiler: the implicit Invariants.
3.1 Portability Issues
The C standard [1] introduces the following three types of behavior
that encode assumptions the compiler makes.
Unspecified Behavior (USB). is defined as the “Use of an unspec-
ified value or other behavior where this International Standard
provides two or more possibilities and imposes no further require-
ments on which is chosen in any instance. Example: Order in which
the arguments to a function is evaluated." (Section 3.3.4 from [1]).
Implementation-Defined Behavior (IDB). is the “Unspecified be-
havior where each implementation documents how the choice is
made Example: the size of types" (Section 3.4.1 from [1]).
Undefined Behavior (UB). is the “Behavior, upon use of a non-
portable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for
which this International Standard imposes no requirements Exam-
ple: behavior on integer overflow." (Section 3.4.3 from [1])
As these properties are explicitly captured by the standard, devel-
opers can use flags and options to control some of the compile-time
behavior, such as the ones described in Section 2. However, this
system is not enough to capture more complex requirements, as
described in the following section.
3.2 Implicit Invariants
Along with the documented explicit behavior (USB, IDB, and UB),
software developers must also encode more indirect behavior that
is critical to ensure security properties: the implicit Invariants, two
of which we present below.
Constant-Time Selection. Many security operations such as pass-
word checking or cryptographic operations should ideally always
execute with the same duration. If not, the systems open side-
channels and are vulnerable to branch prediction, pipeline stalling,
and timing attacks. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the issue through a
branching example. In the C code, whether the if-branch or the
else-branch is executed, the result would be the same to an exter-
nal observer: since one return operation is run, it would take the
same time, so the observer cannot determine which branch the
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Listing 3: Constant-Time Selection Problem – C Code
24 int conditional_select(bool b, int x, int y){
25 if(b){
26 return x;
27 } else {
28 return y;
29 }
30 }
Listing 4: Constant-Time Selection Problem – Assembly
Code
31 ; clang 3.9 -O3 -m32 -march=i386
32 conditional_select(bool , int , int):
33 mov al , byte ptr [esp + 4]
34 test al , al
35 jne .LBB0_1 ; <--- JUMP
36 lea eax , [esp + 12]
37 mov eax , dword ptr [eax]
38 ret
39 .LBB0_1:
40 lea eax , [esp + 8]
41 mov eax , dword ptr [eax]
42 ret
program took. However, in the assembly code, the else-branch has
one more instruction: the jump instruction. So despite the C-code
being able to obfuscate paths, an observer would be able to tell
which branch was used based on how long the program runs. Com-
piler optimizations can thwart the developer’s efforts in obfuscating
the path taken by the program. As of now, there is no option nor
compiler flag that a developer can use to communicate the implicit
requirement of constant-time selection to the compiler. As a result,
developers resort to writing complex logic to outsmart the compiler
and prevent it from optimizing out certain operations. We discuss
this in more detail in Section 4.1.
Secret Erasure. A major concern when handling sensitive data is
to perform amemory scrub to erase it frommemory after its use. An
example is shown in Listings 1 and 2, where a sensitive key is erased
from the RAM. A common technique to erase memory is to use the
memset function. However, the compiler can assume that isolated
calls to memset are not useful, since thememory that is written to by
the memset will not be read again. To improve performance, a DSE
optimization typically removes such calls, leaving sensitive data
exposed at runtime. The current solution in C11 is the memset_s
function, which is guaranteed to be never removed by optimization.
However, its use is still not widely supported [21].
3.3 Desirable Compiler Properties For
Cryptography
In past research, D’Silva et al. [10] have looked at the particular
case of cryptography, and have identified basic implicit invariants
required to support developers. Table 1 details the main three in-
variants, and why they should be supported by compilers. Those
invariants revolve around the protection against side-channels at
runtime. A detailed discussion on the attacks is available in D’Silva
et al.’s paper [10], Section III.C.
Table 2 describes the main measures implemented by developers
in their C code to avoid the attacks mentioned in Table 1. Those
Table 1: Implicit invariants for cryptography
Purpose Use case
Constant Side Effects Avoid side-channel attacks
Constant Control Flow Protection against timing attacks
Constant Memory Ac-
cess
Prevent cache-based side-channel
attacks
Table 2: Techniques used by developers to preserve security
properties
Technique Explanation
Noise Addition Adding arbitrary noise to confuse side-
channel attacks
Bit Splitting Scattering data across memory to make re-
construction harder for attacks on RAM
dumps
Bit Splicing Splitting variables into bits and utilizing bit-
wise operators to mitigate timing attacks
Secret Erasure Scrubbing sensitive data from RAM after
usage
measures aim at obfuscating the program’s footprint, involving
secret erasure—as seen in the previous section—, noise addition,
and bit splitting and splicing. However, compiler optimizations can
render such techniques useless, as illustrated in Listings 1– 4. This
motivates the need for more control on compiler optimizations for
the developer, or for more cooperation between compiler designers
and software developers.
4 PRACTICAL MITIGATIONS OF INSECURE
COMPILER OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we present an overview of existing approaches used
by developers or developed by researchers to circumvent compiler
optimization problems.
4.1 Custom Functions For Constant-Time
Selection
To ensure constant-time selection, developers typically write con-
voluted implementations in order to control the side-effects intro-
duced by compiler optimizations. One such technique is to avoid
the usage of bool and use custom cure to compare integers instead.
Alternatively, some libraries provide functions to support constant-
time integer comparison, such as such as OpenSSL1, which contains
37 of them [21].
In Listing 4 of their paper [21], Simon et al. list four different
versions of such indirect approaches for constant-time selection
and they show that the implementation is not consistent across
different versions of GCC at different optimization levels (we refer
the reader to Tables 1 and 2 of Simon et al.’s paper [21]).
1https://www.openssl.org/
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Listing 5: OpenSSL volatile function pointer
43 typedef void *(* memset_t)(void *,int ,size_t);
44 static volatile memset_t memset_func = &memset;
45 void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr , size_t len){
46 memset_func(ptr , 0, len);
47 }
4.2 Custom Functions For Stack Erasure
In past research, Yang et al. [23] provide a universal scrubbing func-
tion as an easy-to-use C file, which combines the best approaches
found in the real-world open source projects. Their library file also
allows developers to specify their preference with respect to the
scrubbing order. The scrubbing techniques they support include (1)
platform-provided scrubbing functions (e.g., SecureZeroMemory
and memset_s), (2) the memory barrier technique, (3) the volatile
data pointer technique and, (4) the volatile function pointer tech-
nique.
4.3 Disabling Optimization
As an extreme measure, disabling the optimization can prevent
unexpected behavior after compilation. GCC provides predefined
optimization levels such as -O1, -O2, -O3, ... [9] which enables
the corresponding supported optimizations. When no optimization
level is specified, the compiler does not perform any optimization.
However, disabling optimization is often discouraged since it leads
to excessive performance overhead [10].
4.4 Hiding Semantics
Many scrubbing techniques consist in hiding the semantics of their
scrubbing operations from the compiler. The rationale is that if the
compiler fails to recognize that an operation is clearing memory, it
will not remove it. Separate compilation is one such technique where
a scrubbing operation is implemented in a separate compilation
unit. The compiler fails to remove calls to the scrubbing function
because it does not know that it is equivalent to memset. However,
separate compilation is not reliable when link time optimization
(LTO) is enabled, since all compilation units are merged into one,
giving the compiler a global view of the whole program [23]. Thus,
to ensure the success of this technique, the developer needs to have
control over how the program is compiled, and disable LTO.
Another popular technique for hiding a scrubbing operation from
the compiler is to call the memory scrubbing function through a
Volatile function pointer [23]. OPENSSL_cleanse of OpenSSL 1.0.2,
shown in Listing 5, uses this technique. The effect of declaring
memset_func as volatile means that the compilermust read its value
from memory every time it uses it, because the value may have
changed. The compiler does not know the value of memset_func
at compile time, since it cannot recognize the call to memset and
remove it. Yang et al. [23] have confirmed that this technique works
effectively on GCC, Clang and Microsoft Visual C.
4.5 Forcing Memory Writes
An alternative technique is to force the compiler to add the store op-
eration without concealing it. Twomajor techniques are used to this
end.Complicated computationmakes use of a function that reads and
Listing 6: OpenSSL_cleanse
48 unsigned char cleanse_ctr = 0;
49 void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr , size_t len) {
50 unsigned char *p = ptr;
51 size_t loop = len , ctr = cleanse_ctr;
52
53 if (ptr == NULL) return;
54
55 while (loop --) {
56 *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
57 ctr += (17 + (( size_t)p & 0xF;
58 }
59 p = memchr(ptr , (unsigned char)ctr , len);
60
61 if (p) ctr += (63 + (size_t)p);
62 cleanse_ctr = (unsigned char)ctr;
63 }
Listing 7: Linux memzero_explicit
64 #define barrier_data(ptr) \
65 __asm__ __volatile__("": :"r"(ptr) :"memory")
66
67 void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count) {
68 memset(s, 0, count);
69 barrier_data(s);
70 }
writes garbage data from a global variable to the memory that needs
to be scrubbed, thus filling it with garbage. Listing 6 shows an ex-
ample of scrubbing using complicated computation from OpenSSL,
prior to version 1.02. The function OPENSSL_cleanse uses the
global variable cleanse_ctr, which provides varying garbage data.
Since global variables can be accessed from anywhere in the pro-
gram, it is difficult for the compiler to determine whether a function
such as OPENSSL_cleanse is should be optimized out, without run-
ning an inter-procedural analysis on the entire program [23]. This
kind of analysis is considered too costly for compilers to perform.
The other technique, memory barrier, is supported both by GCC
and Clang. Through an inline assembly statement, a simple mem-
ory argument specifies the compiler that the statement may ac-
cess and modify the memory, thereby forcing the compiler to re-
tain the stores instead of terming them as dead [23]. A more re-
liable way to define a memory barrier is illustrated by Linux’s
memzero_explicit, as shown in Listing 7. The difference is the
r(ptr) argument that makes the pointer to the scrubbed memory
visible to the assembly code, and stops the scrubbing store from
being removed.
4.6 Platform-Supplied Functions
The most convenient way to ensure a memory scrub is to use a
dedicated function. Windows provides a SecureZeroMemory im-
plementation which is guaranteed to be secure from optimization.
Microsoft Visual Studio supports this initiative by never optimizing
out a call to SecureZeroMemory. Although it is found to be effective,
it is currently only available on Windows.
Another alternative introduced by the ANSI C standard C11 is
memset_s function which is declared as follows:
errno_t memset_s(void* s,rsize_t smax,int c,rsize_t n)
4
Similar to memset, the memset_s function sets a number of the
bytes starting at address s to the byte value c. The number of bytes
written is the minimum of smax or n. The two buffer sizes guard
against overflows. Despite those guards, memset_s can be misused,
for example, by setting smax or n to 0. Thus, the function would
fail to clear the buffer while preventing a buffer overflow. Although
memset_s seems like an ideal solution, its implementation is slow,
whichwe attribute to the following reasons. Firstly, memset_s is just
part of the optional Appendix K of C11, and was not a required part
of the standard. Secondly, C11 treats all functions in Appendix K as
a single unit, forcing the library to implement all of the functions
defined in the annex. Finally, the poor adoption and perceived flaws
of memset_s have led to calls for its removal from the standard.
5 COMMUNICATING SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS TO COMPILERS
In this section, we discuss the recent work of Yang et al. [23] and Si-
mon et al. [21] that allows software developers to communicate their
security requirements to the compiler. They add explicit support
for the constant-time selection and secret erasure implicit invariants
to Clang2/LLVM3.
Clang/LLVM is a compiler framework that consists of three com-
ponents: the frontend, the optimizer, and the backend. The frontend
translates the source code to an intermediate representation called
LLVM IR. The optimizer is responsible for optimization transfor-
mations on LLVM IR, such as DSE or CSE. The backend translates
the LLVM IR intermediate representation to the target machine
language and performs target-specific optimizations.
5.1 Constant-Time Selection
Simon et al. [21] add the following built-in function into the Clang/L-
LVM framework to support constant-time selection based on a
boolean condition. Their implementation is available online [11].
__builtin_ct_choose(bool condition, Type x, Type y) The
built-in function returns x if condition is true, and y otherwise,
taking constant time for both cases. The condition bool can be a
comparison operator such as ==, !=, etc. The integers x and y must
be of the same integer type in the compiler front-end, otherwise,
the function yields an error.
The authors add support to the x86_64 backend by compiling
the function into assembly code that uses the conditional move
instruction CMOV instead of branches. This instruction was shown
to ensure constant time selection [21]) after other optimizations
are applied. For other backends, the function is compiled into a XOR
instruction which has a generally higher probability to be constant.
The authors evaluated __builtin_ct_choose using two cryp-
tographic implementations: OpenSSL’s X25519 and a self-written
constant-time RSA exponentiation using the Montgomery lad-
der [12]. They used a tool called Dudect [20] to empirically verify
constant-timeliness by using millions of different inputs. Measuring
the CPU cycle overhead, they observed that the built-in solution
has less than 1% overhead for X25519 and is 4% faster with RSA
exponentiation.
2https://clang.llvm.org/
3https://llvm.org/
The usage of a single function such as __builtin_ct_choose
has the potential to improve code readability and usability for the
developers, avoiding complicated workarounds and also guaran-
teeing constant-time selection for future versions of the compiler.
However, the __builtin_ct_choose built-in function only circum-
vents LLVM optimizations but not backend optimizations.
5.2 Secret Erasure
Simon et al. [21] add secret erasure support to the Clang/LLVM
framework by using function annotations. Before detailing their
three approaches to achieve reliable erasure, we first introduce
background knowledge about the assumptions they make, and the
underlying infrastructure of their work.
5.2.1 Background.
CPU, OS and ABI. When compiling a C program, a large number
of libraries and supporting applications, such as platform code, libc,
runtime loader/linker, and Virtual Dynamic Shared Object (VDSO)
are typically required. All of those third-party programs need to be
recompiled after making the changes to the compiler framework for
erasure to be effective over the entire system. In particular, signal
handling in the Linux kernel can be complex when the signal is
handled by storing the CPU state on the stack before stopping the
execution. If a program is located in a sensitive memory block,
sensitive data could be leaked to the stack, so it must be erased too.
Compiler and linker. Similarly to the libraries, the runtime library
also needs to be recompiled. The compiler optimizes implementa-
tions of commonly used functions, sometimes inlining them for
performance’s sake. The effect is a change in the usage of registers,
which should be handled with regards to security. Many other com-
piler features and optimizations also alter the stack, for instance,
tail-call optimization, defer-pop optimization, shrink-wrapping op-
timization, function multi-versioning, or static linker stubs.
The programmer. The developer’s role is critical to ensure proper
erasure in their program. Certain non-returning functions need to
be handled separately, because, unlike other functions, the stack
cannot be erased before returning. The developer should ideally
avoid calling such functions in sensitive code. Variable-sized stacks
should also be avoided.
5.2.2 The Function-Based Approach (FB). The first method for en-
suring secret erasure is the function-based approach (FB) [21]. It
performs stack and register erasure for every sensitive function
and its callees before it returns, using an annotated function. Non-
returning functions are not supported by the approach. Tail-call
optimizations must be disabled for sensitive functions, since they
would make returning functions non-returning, but the authors
decided to globally disable it in their demonstrations. Two vari-
ants are implemented, one with a signal handler (FB with SH) and
another without (FB no SH).
The authors evaluated their approach on OpenSSL, using
mbedTLS to contain the instrumentation, and MiBench to mea-
sure the overhead. Programs using FB with SH show to run 3.39×
slower than without, while FB no SH programs are 1.86× slower.
They also observed that FB solutions are generally not optimal
since callee functions erase the same stack area repetitively.
5
5.2.3 The Stack-Based Approach (SB). The second approach–the
stack-based approach (SB)–instruments all of a program’s func-
tions to keep track of the run-time stack, using the global variable
__GlobalStackValue. When an annotated function returns, the
stack is cleared using the offset value that is calculated based on the
global variable. The implementation is available online, in this file
X86ZeroStackPass.cpp [16]. The authors decided to implement
this functionality in the function epilogue, which is executed just
before the ret, because most registers are not live and will not be
spilled to the stack. This also means that this approach only works
for returning functions. Hence, tail call optimizations must be dis-
abled with SB as well. Simon et al. implemented two variants of SB:
one with bulk register zeroing–which zeros all registers at once in
annotated functions (SB with BRZ), and one on which registers are
erased in every function individually (SB no BRZ).
The approach is verified on OpenSSL, with mbedTLS for the
instrumentation. The overhead measured with SB by this solution
is significantly better than FB, with only 2% overhead for SB no
BRZ and 1% for SB with BRZ. SB is faster because it operates with
the registers to track the stack size, while with FB, the memory is
erased for every function. Note that instrumenting the musl-libc
library increases its size by 6.6% and 4.9% for SB no BRZ and SB
with BRZ respectively.
5.2.4 The Call-Graph Based Approach (CGB). The last approach by
Simon et al. is the call-graph based approach (CGB). It determines
the maximum stack usage of a sensitive function at compilation
time to eliminate the need for callee instrumentation. Themaximum
stack usage information is used as a heuristic to achieve a smaller
footprint. The approach creates a call-graph of the program, which
is used to identify the registers that would be written to, and the
maximum stack usage for all annotated functions, thereby removing
the need to instrument every function. This approach supports tail
call optimization is supported by this approach. Software developers
are simply required to annotate the function pointers. A limitation
of CGB is that call-graphs cannot handle infinite recursive functions,
so a maximum depth should be specified.
The only overhead caused by this approach is the actual erasure
which cannot be avoided. CGB is the fastest and most compact
solution of the three approaches. A detailed comparison of the three
approaches can be found in Table 3 of Simon et al.’s paper [21].
5.3 Secure Memset Implementation
Sometimes, developers do not endorse a specific compiler and rely
on more manual techniques to prevent scrubbing operations from
being optimized. For this use case, Yang et al. [23] have developed
a standalone scrubbing function secure_memzero. This function
integrates effective scrubbing techniques such as platform supplied
functions, volatile function pointers and the memory barrier tech-
nique, as described in Section 4.2. The implementation is done in a
header file secure_memzero.h, which can be included in a C/C++
source file. An order of preference for the different techniques can
be specified using macros. By default, the implementation is carried
out in the order mentioned above.
5.4 Inhibiting Scrubbing DSE
Yang et al. [23] also implement a scrubbing-safe dead store elim-
ination option in Clang 3.9.0. It prevents DSE optimization from
removing scrubbing operations by identifying the potential scrub-
bing operations beforehand.
A store instruction can be marked as a memory scrubbing oper-
ation if:
• The value being stored is a constant.
• The number of bytes is constant.
• The store will be eliminated because it goes out of scope
without being read.
In their implementation, the authors retain all dead stores satis-
fying the conditions above regardless of whether they are sensitive
or not. This leads to false positives when some non-sensitive dead
stores are preserved. The authors argue that this implementation
does not require any changes to the underlying source code, and
only relies on the scrubbing techniques discussed in Section 4.2. The
authors also note that with the help of developers, who can mark
the actual sensitive data, the false positives rate can be improved.
Developer work is reduced from using complicated workarounds
to annotating store instructions.
On the SPEC 2006 benchmark, the implementation shows an
overhead of around 1%. By completely disabling DSE from clang,
the performance overhead remains under 2%, except for the 403.gcc
benchmark, where it reached 5%.
6 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we investigate large open-source cryptographic
libraries and projects that use techniques to implicitly control com-
piler optimizations, or that implement and propose such techniques
for developer usage. A summary of our findings is found in Sec-
tion 6.7.
6.1 BearSSL
BearSSL4 is an implementation of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols (RFC 5246) written
in C, with a focus on portability, size and flexibility. BearSSL fol-
lows the guidelines of “The Cryptography Coding Standard (CCS)"
for the implementation of constant-time operations in C. Their
implementation can be found online, in the file src/inner.h [4].
Constant-time conditional copy is achieved using the br_ccopy()
[3] function.
In addition, constant-time AES and DES implementations in
BearSSL use bit slicing techniques. Constant-time RSA and Elliptic
Curves are enabled through a custom constant-time implementa-
tion of big integers.
BearSSL does not provide a secure memory wipe function but
suggests using memset and an example code for stack erasure [5].
4https://www.bearssl.org/
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6.2 Monocypher
Monocypher5 is a lightweight, auditable cryptographic library
written in portable C [18]. It provides custom secure compari-
son functions such as crypto_verify16, crypto_verify32, and
crypto_verify64 [17].
Monocypher provides a secure memory wipe function
crypto_wipe [17] which uses the volatile pointer technique.
6.3 Libsodium
Sodium6 is a cryptographic library which is a portable, cross-
compilable, installable, and packageable fork of NaCl7. It provides
a sodium_memzero [15] function that first uses platform provided
functions and then weak linkage techniques [23] to ensure secret
erasure. Note that this may be insecure if compiled with LTO.
The sodium_memcmp function [15] of Sodium ensures constant-
time comparison. It also uses the weak symbols technique [23]
or volatile pointers [23], depending on what is available on the
platform.
6.4 Libgcrypt
Libgcrypt8 is another cryptographic library based on GnuPG.
Libgcrypt implements a wipememory secure erasure based on the
volatile data pointer technique [23]. However, with a recent com-
mit [14] the Libgcrypt authors encourage developers to favor the
platform function explicit_bzero [23] instead.
Libgcrypt also provides a custom function to perform constant-
time comparison of two buffers: buf_eq_const [13].
6.5 Crypto++
Crypto++ is a C++ class implementing cryptographic algorithms. It
defines SecureWipeBuffer [8], which scrubs memory by using cus-
tom assembly and the volatile data pointer technique [23]. Crypto++
also uses the SecBlock class, which provides a secure storage that
is wiped when the block is destroyed.
In addition, Crypto++ contains the class VerifyBufsEqual [7],
a constant-time comparison function utilizing bitwise operators.
6.6 OpenSSL
OpenSSL9 is a toolkit for the SSL/TLS protocols and a general-
purpose cryptography library. It uses OPENSSL_cleanse [19] to
scrub memory, defaulting to its own assembly implementations
unless the no-asm flag is specified at configuration. Version 1.0.2
and above uses the volatile function pointer technique for calls to
memset [23].
Constant-time comparison of integers is supported in OpenSSL
by implementing 37 different functions [21].
6.7 Summary
Table 3 presents an overview of the secure erasure techniques used
in the open-source projects and libraries presented in the previous
5https://monocypher.org/
6https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/
7https://nacl.cr.yp.to/
8https://www.gnupg.org/software/libgcrypt/index.html
9https://www.openssl.org/
Table 3: Priorities of memory erasure techniques in open-
source projects. A smaller number shows that the technique
is preferred over a larger number. “-” denotes that the tech-
nique is not implemented in the project.
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Bearssl - - - - - -
Monocypher - - 1 - - -
Libsodium 1 3 4 - 2 -
Libgcrypt 1 - 2 - - -
Crypto++ - 1 2 - - -
OpenSSL - 1 2 3 - -
sections. Each column represents a particular memory-erasure tech-
nique. Platform represents secure scrubbing operations provided by
the underlying platform, e.g. Windows’ SecureZeroMemory, BSD’s
explicit_bzero, or C11’s memset_s. Asm is inline assembly code,
and Volatile includes two possible techniques: volatile data pointer
and volatile function pointer. Those two techniques rely on the fact
that volatile-qualified types are defined in the standard as having
“unknown side effects", thus they are not directly optimized by the
compiler. Comp. includes techniques which use complex computa-
tion to force the compiler to scrub memory. With the WL (Weak
Linkage) technique, the developer defines weak definitions, a way of
informing the compiler of future replacement at link time. Finally,
memset denotes the usage of the default memset function. Those
six techniques are described in detail by Yang et al. [23]. Table 3
marks whether a project uses a certain technique, and if it does, it
provides a prioritization number representing which technique is
applied first, second, etc.
We see that different projects use a variety of techniques to reach
the common goals of constant-time execution and secure memory
erasure, some of which are custom-made and must be used with
certain requirements. They help developers code with security
requirements in mind, however, they only treat the symptoms of
the problem. In addition to existing solutions, we advocate for
developers and compiler designers to reach a mutual consensus
and design a system that allows developers to have more control of
the optimization options into the compiler.
7 RELATEDWORK
Cauligi et al. [6] argue that C is not suitable for both fast and read-
able codewith cryptographic properties due to high-level constructs
introducing timing vulnerabilities. They explore an alternate solu-
tion to use a domain specific language and a compiler that enable
programmers to express implicit security properties, and produce
timing-attack free code.
Abate et al. [2] study compartmentalized components and sug-
gest how individual components should be protected from others
even if they become compromised due to undefined behavior. The
authors formally define a dynamic compromise of compartmental-
ized components and establish a criterion for secure compilation
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chain. This work highlights how one compromised component can
potentially leak cryptographic keys from other components.
Reparaz et al. [20] implement a minimal tool that verifies if a
program runs in constant time on a particular platform, without
needing tomodel the hardware. It relies on statistical analysis rather
than static analysis.
Wang et al. [22] explain howmodern compilers exploit undefined
behavior specifications of C/C++ to perform aggressive compiler
optimization which introduces unpredictable outcomes. This details
a formal and practical approach to find undefined behavior bugs by
introducing a static checker called “Stack" that identifies such bugs.
D’Silva et al. [10] detail the gap between the state of a program
and the state of a machine. The authors propose accurate machine
models to reason about the impact of compiler optimization on
security, and also recommend future directions for research.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
Despite being used in large software projects, the different ap-
proaches discussed in Section 4 are still not direct solutions to the
compiler optimization problem. As a result, they run into limita-
tions such as being weak to LTO, for example. While techniques
that address the side effects are workarounds, the compiler-based
approaches are a step in the right direction, addressing the main
issue directly by introducing changes in the compiler itself. How-
ever, such solutions are still only academic, since adoption by the
community is a difficult thing to achieve.
In addition, compiler-based solutions also run into other limita-
tions, as mentioned in Section 5.
• Experimental results show a varying performance overhead
associated with the compiler-based solutions.
• The presence of false positives eaves window for further
research into the topic for more accurate results.
• The approaches discussed are limited to a single compiler
framework, which would lead to poor adoption by the com-
munity.
• Security requirements are largely undocumented in the C
standard guide, which means that compilers which are fol-
lowing official guidelines do not need to support implicit
security requirements.
We argue that compiler development should consider developer
intentions and requirements. Yang et al. [23] and Simon et al. [21]
both advocate for compilers with explicit support for secure mem-
ory wiping and constant-time support as a starting point in the
right direction. Going a step further, we suggest that research efforts
should focus on how desirable properties can be made universal
by adding support from the compiler framework. In the future,
hardware based support for secure systems should also be explored,
especially in situations where embedded systems are to be deployed
in an open-world scenario and are prone to attacks.
In parallel to research, we see value in spreading the word in
industry about the importance of software security requirements
in compiler optimization. Working groups can encourage the adop-
tion of such requirements is existing standards, to bridge the gap
between compiler designers and software developers.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed how developer approaches to writing
secure software often require to write convoluted code and design
indirect solutions that outsmart compilers. We discussed existing
solutions used in industry, and developed in current research, and
argue that instead of using convoluted workarounds, researchers
and practitioners should address the main problem directly, and
work towards support for security considerations directly in the
compiler framework. There is a large open area of collaborative
research between software engineering and compiler design in
how to make performant, multi-platform, compilers that support
security requirements with respect to compiler optimization. More-
over, while the current state-of-the-art demands further research,
a bigger challenge is the adoption of current studies and security
requirements into mainstream compilers.
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